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 This workshop was convened to examine Southeast Asian perceptions of nuclear security 
and nonproliferation challenges, and to explore opportunities for international and regional 
cooperation to address them.  
 Historically, these challenges have been few and the need for cooperation small in 
Southeast Asia. With only a handful of nuclear research reactors and small communities of 
experts, the region’s nuclear capabilities have been very limited. And in the absence of major 
international threats, governments have faced no incentive to reconsider their traditionally strong 
commitments to nonproliferation. 
 However, both of these conditions are changing. In response to rising energy demand, 
several Southeast Asian governments are now planning to develop substantial nuclear energy 
sectors by the 2020s. And in recent years, Southeast Asia’s insulation from great power rivalries 
has declined. This is most evident in the South China Sea. But it is also apparent in the debate 
over ASEAN’s ability to remain at the core of Asian multilateral security institutions. 
Since an initial workshop in 2009, Southeast Asian interest in nuclear energy has grown 
and awareness of strategic uncertainty has increased. At the same time, understanding of nuclear 
security and proliferation dangers has been enhanced, as seven Southeast Asian countries 
participated in the first Nuclear Security Summit, and a Philippine diplomat chaired the NPT 
Review Conference.  
Nevertheless, most Southeast Asian participants in this workshop still believe that their 
region neither faces nor presents major nuclear security or proliferation risks. They feel that their 
governments’ commitments to the NPT and SEANWFZ are sufficient guarantees against these 
dangers. Moreover, they emphasize that all countries in the region (except Burma) have 
cooperated closely with the IAEA. Political elites in the region view discussions about 
enrichment and reprocessing as premature. 
Participants from outside the region are less sanguine. In their view, Southeast Asian 
governments have not done enough to prepare for worst-case outcomes. They believe that 
governments in the region should adopt all major nuclear security and nonproliferation 
conventions, fulfill their obligations under UNSCR 1540, and initiate discussions about 
enrichment and reprocessing. Many felt that ASEAN should endorse these steps and even 
coordinate regional implementation of international standards. 
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Southeast Asian participants are wary of creating new international obligations or using 
regional institutions to enforce international agreements. They prefer to rely on voluntary 
national implementation of internationally agreed standards. However, ASEAN is already 
coordinating nuclear safety efforts among its members, and their reluctance to embrace regional 
approaches to nuclear security and nonproliferation reflects a sense that these are less pressing 
concerns than nuclear safety.  
 Throughout the workshop, there was vigorous and often critical discussion about 
ASEAN’s ability to facilitate cooperation in support of nuclear security and nonproliferation. But 
this led to several important conclusions. 
One is that ASEAN can act when it reaches consensus. This is especially true at the 
functional or operational level, and evident in the area of nuclear safety. However, nuclear 
security and nonproliferation are not yet seen as pressing issues for the region, so there is no 
consensus among countries that regional action is required.  
Second, even when a consensus exists among ASEAN members, the Association itself 
may not be the ideal forum through which to act. It simply lacks the expertise and resources that 
international institutions already possess.  
Third, a lack of cooperation within the ASEAN framework should not be taken as 
evidence that ASEAN members are unwilling to cooperate at all. When a broad consensus exists 
that action is needed, but regional capabilities are limited, members are likely to cooperate with 
internationally recognized institutions that can offer expertise, resources, and legitimacy.  
Indeed, all ASEAN members (except Burma) are strongly inclined to cooperate closely with the 
IAEA. 
Finally, even when ASEAN lacks technical and financial resources, the Association can 
still play a critical role in facilitating cooperation by endorsing internationally agreed standards, 
agreements, and commitments. However, there is little support in the region for ASEAN to 
coordinate regional implementation of international standards.  
For the future, several issues merit further attention. One concerns the future of 
SEANWFZ. The NWS have raised expectations in the region that they will agree to an amended 
protocol in the near term. This would provide a basis for expanded cooperation on nuclear 
proliferation. However, awareness is growing in Southeast Asia that the treaty under which 
SEANWFZ was established may need to be updated in order to address contemporary WMD 
challenges. 
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Another is NWS support for disarmament, since there was a widespread feeling in 
Southeast Asia that recent progress on nonproliferation was made possible by NWS progress on 
disarmament. 
The last is the gap between regional and international priorities on two critical issues: 
discussion of enrichment and reprocessing, and concrete steps to address the dangers of nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear security. In both cases, there is less enthusiasm in Southeast Asia than 




This report summarizes the presentations, discussion, and findings of the conference, 
which was convened by Dr. Michael Malley, a lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School and Dr. 
Tanya Ogilvie-White, a senior lecturer at the University of Canterbury.  
This conference, the second in a series, was intended to assess emerging trends in 
Southeast Asia that may increase the probability of nuclear proliferation in previously 
unanticipated ways. In particular, it was intended to gauge Southeast Asian perceptions and 
understandings of these trends, including the possibly widespread use of nuclear energy amid 
growing strategic uncertainty in the region. 
Because these trends are emerging ones, and their potential interactions are complex, the 
conveners purposely selected participants with expertise in a wide range of scientific and policy 
fields related to nuclear energy, nonproliferation, and regional security. Participants were drawn 
from all major countries in Southeast Asia, as well as Australia, India, New Zealand, and the 
United States. 
About half of the participants took part in a previous conference, held in 2009, so the 
discussions that took place during this conference represent the continuation of a dialogue that 
began over a year earlier.  
In both conferences, participants assessed Southeast Asian nuclear programs and 
nonproliferation policies. However, the 2011 meeting considered a set of issues that the 2009 
meeting had identified for further discussion: the impact of great power rivalry on Southeast 
Asia, and the relevance to the region of international efforts to address nuclear proliferation, 





Session One: Nuclear Power Plans in Southeast Asia 
• The nuclear energy plans of Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia continue apace, while 
Thailand has taken a step back from its previous plans. The primary motivating factor for 
nuclear energy development is energy security, as states seek to increase and diversify 
their energy supplies. 
• However, observers from outside the region believe some countries may be motivated by 
the pursuit of political prestige as much as economic considerations. 
• Effective nuclear energy cooperation under the purview of ASEAN is likely to develop 
slowly. Governments already cooperate closely with the IAEA and see much less benefit 
to cooperating with each other. 
 
Session Two: Nuclear Dangers  
• Within the region, there is little concern that any country’s nuclear power plans will 
provoke concern among its neighbors. However, observers from outside the region 
expect countries to watch each other’s nuclear energy development very closely, and they 
warned that any decision to embark on indigenous enrichment or reprocessing would be 
considered significant. 
• Whether nuclear energy aspirants should pursue UAE-style nuclear cooperation 
agreements is controversial in the region. Some feel the discussion is premature; others 
believe that restrictions on indigenous enrichment and reprocessing would only be 
acceptable in the context of reciprocal concessions by the NWS. 
• Evidence that Myanmar is cheating on its nonproliferation obligations is compelling, but 
its program is small and at the prototype stage. This problem could be addressed by 
cutting IAEA technical cooperation and increasing pressure from neighbors (perhaps 
including a SEANWFZ fact-finding mission). However, there is little enthusiasm in the 
region for such steps. 
• There is still some resistance in the region to UN Security Council Resolution 1540. 
However, states are becoming more willing to seek assistance to plug capacity gaps (for 
example, in policing borders and identifying dual-use items). 
• There are concerns in the region that nuclear security is becoming a “fourth pillar” of the 
NPT. There is a deficit of trust on the issue of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
and corresponding obligations on nuclear weapons states to disarm. 
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Session Three: Great Power Rivalry and Regional Security 
• Participants from within the region expressed little concern about the strategic 
implications for Southeast Asia of the rise of China and India. Observers from outside the 
region worried that Southeast Asians have a rose-tinted view of the ability of regional 
institutions to mitigate proliferation pressures, especially those created by China’s 
military expansion and growing regional assertiveness. 
• Vocal U.S. support for Southeast Asia in the South China Sea dispute may be creating 
expectations among some Southeast Asia countries that the United States would come to 
their aid if China adopted a more aggressive policy. 
• The ASEAN Regional Forum is not necessarily regarded as the appropriate forum to 
promote Asia-Pacific security cooperation. Some in the region believe other regional 
organizations may be “more efficient” due to their smaller membership. 
• It could be argued that Southeast Asian states are taking a “self-help” approach to their 
strategic security, through conventional hedging and the use of regional organizations. 
However, it is not yet clear that nuclear energy development is a part of this self-help 
strategy. 
 
Session Four: Dealing with WMD Challenges 
• There is a common perception in the region that WMD threats are much less urgent than 
other challenges, including economic development and internal security. 
• This underpins the view that security policies should not focus on external defense or 
hard security issues, but on creating stability through prosperity and human security at 
both the national and regional levels. 
• Regional security institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, are not robust 
enough to provide frameworks for effective counter-WMD cooperation. 
• PSI is more effective than regional institutions, but most countries in the region remain 
distrustful of institutions that are neither ASEAN-related nor UN-sanctioned. 
• Some participants from the region suggested that functional cooperation on nuclear 
security might have advanced further than strategic agreement on these issues. 
 
Session Five: Prospects for Cooperation – International Initiatives 
• There is still some wariness in Southeast Asia over U.S.-led plurilateral nonproliferation 
initiatives, such as PSI. Most states in the region maintain the NAM position that there is 
no need to participate. 
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• Most states in Southeast Asia are strongly committed to the NPT, SEANWFZ and IAEA, 
and regard these institutions as the keys to nonproliferation in Southeast Asia. 
• However, significant challenges exist. SEANWFZ is in danger of becoming obsolete 
unless it is updated to address 21st century issues. New forums and arrangements (such as 
the working group on high level waste management) are needed, and ASEAN needs to 
develop a concrete plan to implement the 2010 NPT Review Conference “Action Plan.” 
• There is no “ASEAN position” regarding multilateral nuclear fuel cycle proposals, and 
none is likely to emerge. States in the region regard discussions about the fuel cycle as 
premature. 
• ASEAN has not considered how it would deal with a case of withdrawal from the NPT. 
There are no provisions for calling an emergency meeting if this were to occur in 
Southeast Asia. Some states in the region believe the option for withdrawal from the NPT 
under Article X is not appropriate so there could be some movement on this in future. 
 
Session Six: Prospects for Cooperation – Regional Initiatives 
• ASEAN is not synonymous with “Southeast Asia.” A lack of cooperation within ASEAN 
institutions on nuclear issues does not mean countries in the region are unwilling to 
address them cooperatively. In fact, they often prefer to do so through the IAEA or the 
UN. 
• It important to be realistic about ASEAN’s limits. When it comes to WMD issues, 
ASEAN members look to the Western members of ARF to deal with them because the 
former have neither the capacity nor the interest, whereas the latter have both. 
• To date, SEANWFZ has been more symbolic than substantial. Implementation of the 
2007 “Plan of Action” would transform it into a more practical agreement, but this is tied 
to NWS signing the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty, which they have not yet done. 
• Widespread interest in the development of nuclear energy creates new opportunities for 
regional cooperation, especially in human resource development, fuel supply, and 
radioactive waste management. 
• Cooperation in these areas could strengthen the economic and security pillars in the 
ASEAN Community that the region plans to form by 2015. 
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PANEL PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Session One: Nuclear Power Plans in Southeast Asia 
Dr. Carolina Hernandez (University of the Philippines) chaired the opening panel, which 
included presentations by Dr. Chang Youngho (Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
Singapore), Dr. Ferhat Aziz (National Nuclear Energy Agency, Indonesia), Dr. Noramly Bin 
Muslim (Atomic Energy Licensing Board, Malaysia), and Dr. Ta Minh Tuan (Diplomatic 
Academy of Vietnam). 
The opening session examined the growing demand for energy in Southeast Asia, and the 
place of nuclear energy in governments’ efforts to satisfy this demand. To help participants 
understand the context in which several Southeast Asian countries are considering nuclear 
energy, Chang Youngho offered an overview of their energy policies. Across the region, he said, 
governments seek to diversify their sources of energy in order to meet rising demand and 
enhance their own energy security. At this time, all countries rely heavily on fossil fuels and 
none relies on nuclear energy.  
In his view, nuclear energy is the leading alternative to fossil fuels, but energy 
diversification policies may also include solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and biomass. However, 
countries face significant barriers to exploiting the full range of options. Among these, Dr. 
Chang listed a lack of experience with key technologies; a lack of manpower for the operation of 
nuclear power plants; a lack of funding for large energy projects; underdeveloped policy 
frameworks for dealing with nuclear power; a lack of institutional, financial and technical 
structures to promote renewable energy options; reliance on national rather than regional power 
grids; and a lack of private sector participation. 
The second panelist was Ferhat Aziz, who spoke about Indonesia’s nuclear energy 
development. Due to rapidly rising demand for electricity, he said, Indonesia needs to triple its 
generation capacity by 2025. Renewable alternatives are not suitable, he said, because their 
supply is not stable enough. Moreover, the supplies of some renewable energy sources are 
located on islands that are distant from the consumers who need energy. As the world’s largest 
archipelagic country, with over 17,000 islands, Indonesia faces unique challenges in meeting its 
people’s demand for energy. To serve the major population centers, he said that nuclear power 
remained the best option over the long term. 
Dr. Aziz noted that the government has conducted feasibility studies and identified 
potential nuclear reactor locations. However, this has been met with opposition from community 
leaders and social interest groups, namely in Muria (Central Java) where protests have delayed 
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further progress. In addition to further outreach to the community, the next steps the next step 
will involve working with the IAEA to perform an Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure review, and 
resolving some outstanding issues regarding the responsibilities of the facility owners. In 
addition, nuclear human resources development is ongoing through a national team, which 
includes the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Research and Technology, BATAN (Atomic 
Energy Agency), BAPETEN (Nuclear Regulatory Agency), and universities. 
Next, Noramly bin Muslim spoke about the preparations Malaysia is making to establish 
its own nuclear power industry. At the behest of Malaysia’s current Prime Minister, he said, the 
country has a stated goal of operationalizing a nuclear energy infrastructure by July 2021. This 
goal comes hard on the heels of the country’s announcement that by 2019 conventional energy 
supplies will no longer be sufficient to meet demand. 
In early 2011, the Malaysian nuclear power corporation was formed, and Malaysia aims 
to have its first nuclear power plant ready within a decade. This new corporation has three 
objectives: to plan and coordinate the implementation of the nuclear power plant; to ensure that 
infrastructure meets IAEA requirements; and to select the owner and operator of the nuclear 
power plant. In order to meet these goals, the government must overcome several challenges. 
Among these, Dr. Noramly highlighted the difficulty of winning public acceptance, financing the 
project, conducting feasibility studies and formally selecting plant sites, as well as adhering to 
international norms and regulations associated with nuclear power.  
In the session’s final presentation, Ta Minh Tuan focused on the often-overlooked issue 
of nuclear security in Southeast Asia, which, he said, would grow in importance as countries 
develop nuclear power. He noted that governments in the region have tended to focus more 
heavily on nuclear safety issues, while neglecting nuclear security. Opponents of nuclear power, 
who raise concerns about the safety of nuclear reactors, have reinforced this tendency. In 
addition, he noted, there is a paucity of publications about nuclear security by Southeast Asian 
experts. 
The problem is compounded by the perception that nuclear power is not an immediate 
problem. Therefore, he said, many people adopt an attitude of “let’s wait and see what happens.” 
At the official level, this attitude is reflected in the reluctance of governments in the region to 
sign or ratify international conventions dealing with nuclear security. In fact, the SEANWFZ 
omits any implementation of nuclear security cooperation or policies.  
Dr. Tuan went on to address the threats to nuclear security posed by non-state actors and 
illicit networks in the region. Southeast Asia is a major transshipment point for dual-use items, 
ne noted, and remains weak in its ability to effectively enforce freight inspections. He concluded 
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his presentation by stressing the need for change in the perceptions of nuclear security in 
Southeast Asia, increased focus on securing nuclear material, collective signing and ratification 
of conventions that deal with nuclear security, and revising of the SEANWFZ to include 
requirements for nuclear security. 
Discussion 
The discussion session began with a question on whether rivalry is driving the need or 
desire for nuclear energy. There was some agreement among Southeast Asian participants that 
this was not the case. One participant remarked, “Whoever builds the first nuclear power plant 
will share that energy with others.” 
This led others to question why all countries in the region aren’t buying into regional 
cooperation from the beginning, if there is no rivalry among countries. There was general 
agreement that any rivalry on this issue is commercial rather than political, that the need for 
nuclear power in Southeast Asia was genuinely economic, and that is not motivated by prestige 
factors. As a speaker from the region commented, “Vietnam and Malaysia, for example, need a 
lot of power and quickly – by 2019, Malaysia’s demand will exceed its supply. We have to 
choose a nuclear power program. With our current conventional power program, we sell power 
to Thailand and Singapore, and vice versa. Malaysia imports power during the day, and exports 
to Thailand at night. We cooperate—the rivalry is commercial, not political.” Similarly, other 
participants remarked that when ASEAN states started to build nuclear research reactors, this 
was supposed to be the beginning of the expansion of nuclear technology. Through this 
development, states in the region have gained nuclear experience. The motivation has never been 
political, one Southeast Asian participant said, and noted,  “When[ever] states began to look at 
nuclear power, it was because there was a need for it [i.e., energy].” 
However, a participant from outside the region commented that, “It does seem like there 
is a race to be the first to build a nuclear reactor in the region,” adding that “while it may not be 
rivalry, it also doesn’t look like cooperation—it looks like nuclear technology is being 
considered on the basis of national pride and confidence, which may impact on and hinder 
cooperation.”  
One participant questioned why Southeast Asian states were interested in nuclear energy 
in particular, and whether this technology was appropriate for the region. Some participants 
stated that hydropower also has great potential, but unless the ASEAN power grid is connected 
and the energy shared, no energy options with reach their full potential. However, another 
consideration is energy security: “if we buy from our neighbors, the supply is not secure. This is 
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why we consider nuclear power plants.” To some, this reinforced the sense of rivalry among 
countries in the region. 
On the subject of Dr. Tuan’s presentation, one participant commented, “The problem is 
that we don’t know how to work together on nuclear security. The [ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting (ARF-ISM)] body took two years to be established, and had to drop the 
word ‘security.’ Energy ministers are only concerned about energy production, not security of 
facilities and materials. But mostly, we [in the region] are afraid of bureaucratic paperwork, 
which is why we don’t sign as many treaties and conventions. 
Session Two: Nuclear Dangers 
Session Two was chaired by Dr. Tan See Seng (Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
Singapore). Presentations were made by Dr. Maria Rost Rublee (University of Auckland, New 
Zealand), Mr. Robert Kelley (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden), and 
Dr. Tanya Ogilvie-White (University of Canterbury, New Zealand). 
In this panel, participants were asked to consider the full range of nuclear dangers that 
exist in the region, or are likely to arise in the future. In particular, panelists were asked to 
examine how assessments of these dangers is changing, and what types of developments could 
affect perceptions of these dangers in the future? More narrowly, the panel also considered 
whether Myanmar presents a nuclear proliferation threat. 
Maria Rost Rublee began the session with an examination of the main factors that might 
shape Southeast Asian perceptions of nuclear danger. In her view, there are three main categories 
of contributing factors: the nascent security community in ASEAN; national nuclear energy 
policies; and Australia’s dominant position in the region.  
The creation of a security community, she argued, could be an antidote to proliferation, 
as the regulation of behavior creates stability among community members. Relationship building 
increases trust and reduces threat perceptions, which will be important as the region embarks on 
nuclear energy development. She also noted that the conduct of national nuclear energy policies 
acts as a signal to other states about future intentions, which feed into the global nonproliferation 
regime. If Australia develops nuclear power, its actions could increase threat perceptions in 
Southeast Asia, especially for its closer neighbors. If states such as Indonesia react, there could 
be a snowball response. In terms of existing nuclear energy plans, states in the region need to be 
conscious that their route to nuclear energy development will be watched very closely by their 
neighbors and by the wider international community for any signs of military intentions. Any 
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decision to embark on indigenous enrichment or reprocessing would be considered significant, 
whether or not the decision is driven by energy considerations. 
Robert Kelley offered a detailed examination of evidence about a possible nuclear 
weapons program in Burma. According to Kelley, who has written extensively on this subject, 
Burma is cheating on its nonproliferation obligations, but its program is small and at the 
prototype stage. In 2010, images emerged of Burmese nuclear fuel cycle components, along with 
information on the intent to build a reactor, enrich uranium and develop weapons. To respond to 
Burma, he argued, the IAEA needs to be strengthened; IAEA technical cooperation aid to Burma 
(which was valued at $1.3 billion 2008-09) should be cut; and pressure from ASEAN should be 
increased.  
Tanya Ogilvie-White outlined nuclear security challenges in Southeast Asia, which she 
argued are significant and growing. Southeast Asia is a region of economic dynamism with some 
of world’s biggest trade routes and transit points. There is widespread use of nuclear technology 
and growing nuclear infrastructure in the region (nuclear energy programmes will increase the 
potential for illicit trade in sensitive nuclear related materials). The region has a geography of 
long, difficult maritime and land borders, which are difficult to patrol. In addition, there is a 
culture of lax border controls and tourist-friendly visa requirements (especially in Thailand) and 
network of dynamic multi-product illicit trafficking networks, which countries in the region are 
having difficulty shutting down.  Terrorist groups are known to operate in the region, often using 
existing criminal networks to operate (those involved in these networks are entrepreneurial in 
their approach, and would be willing to acquire any materials for the right price). More states in 
the region recognise these vulnerabilities, which are significant for all WMD controls. But there 
is still some resistance to Resolution 1540. She noted that, despite this, there has been progress in 
bilateral nuclear security cooperation with the IAEA. Her main point was that nuclear security 
steps are being taken, even if ASEAN itself does not often refer to the language of Resolution 
1540 (for political reasons).    
Discussion 
The second discussion session began with a series of question about Southeast Asian 
countries’ failure to sign nuclear security instruments and conventions: Why haven’t they signed 
them? Is it due to political baggage and slow political processes? Do states not see signing these 
conventions as buying real security? Are they cost prohibitive to implement? 
From the perspective of those from outside the region, it seemed that there is a lot of 
direct but quiet cooperation between Southeast Asian countries and the IAEA when those 
countries identify capacity gaps that urgently need to be filled. Filling these gaps rather than 
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signing international agreements appears to be their top priority. Signing conventions involves a 
lot of paperwork and is labor intensive. Differing priorities was also perceived to be one of the 
reasons that states had not discussed nuclear security instruments: nuclear security and 
nonproliferation are not very high on their national agendas. 
However, one speaker note that this may be changing: “When 1540 was first passed, 
states were asked to identify their own gaps. Malaysia proudly declared: ‘we don’t need any 
assistance—we can offer assistance to others.’ This was actually nonsense, given Malaysia’s 
capacity problems. More recently, Malaysia provided a detailed report to the 1540 Committee 
that actually identified its own gaps for the first time, which shows a significant change in 
attitude. The assistance clause in 1540 is very clear, and donor states are willing to throw money 
at it. States in Southeast Asia are now much more willing than they initially were to identify 
gaps, for example, in policing borders, identifying dual-use items; and they are more willing to 
accept money to help plug these gaps. “ 
From the perspective of Southeast Asian participants, lack of progress on nuclear security 
can be attributed simply to a lack of expertise and lack of experience. “Now that nuclear security 
is more of a pressing matter, we have to go for it. Malaysia will be signing a few [conventions] 
in coming years,” one participant said. 
Although some participants found the evidence on Burma’s nuclear program compelling, 
one participant took issue with the idea that the Burmese government is doing things secretively 
that could be done openly. “They would probably buy candy bars this way,” he said. He asked 
for further elaboration on Kelley’s comment that the U.S. State Department wouldn’t agree with 
his assessment. Kelley responded that he had presented information provided by the Burmese 
defectors to the U.S. state department, foreign correspondents club, and others, and had only 
received a lukewarm response.  
Another participant explained that Indonesia’s attitude to the Burma revelations is also 
interesting: in Jakarta there is the perception that the “talk of a Burmese nuclear program can’t be 
true, because Burma has signed the NPT. The IAEA has wonderful tools, this can’t be 
happening.” 
In response, it was argued that the IAEA is not the right organization to deal with Burma. 
“They are now in the process of another letter exchange, but the IAEA doesn’t have any power. 
The IAEA has already been denied entry by Burma.” Others agreed that based on the bad 
experience with the DPRK, the IAEA should be cutting IAEA technical cooperation assistance to 
Burma now, rather than waiting until it’s too late. 
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The discussion then moved toward the question of how the Burma issue could be 
addressed: “If the IAEA has no authority, and has been rebuffed 3 times by the Burmese 
government, what would be a non-U.S. / non-Myanmar mechanism or avenue where this issue 
could be raised, discussed and some sort of agreement reached?” 
Suggestions from participants included a broad-scope WMD-issues unit within the UN, 
and existing provisions under SEANWFZ that allow fact-finding and clarification- seeking. So 
far, however, no SEANWFZ members have considered this option.  
A member of the panel agreed that the evidence was compelling, that it seems as though 
the Burmese government has the intention, but not the capability to acquire nuclear weapons. 
However, in looking at the success of the Burmese nuclear program, it is useful to compare it to 
that of Iraq. In Iraq, almost all the progress happened within the last few years. The program was 
doing badly, and then was suddenly fixed.  
In the discussion on nuclear security, a number of participants noted that the three pillars 
of the NPT could not be viewed in isolation from one another. They also expressed concerns that 
nuclear security is becoming a “fourth pillar,” to which non-nuclear states have never agreed. 
The point was made that there is a deficit of trust on the issue of the right to peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy and corresponding obligations on nuclear weapons states to disarm. Developing 
states get a raw deal, the speaker said, because they are being put under pressure to take on more 
nonproliferation and nuclear security obligations when states with nuclear weapons are not 
upholding their end of the bargain.  
In response to this, another participant pointed out that the Obama administration is 
currently engaged in bridge-building efforts to prove that it is serious about disarmament, and 
there have been some positive results, such as New START. But the question is: why are these 
efforts not appreciated? What would it take to boost political will on the part of NNWS to adhere 
to stronger nuclear security and nonproliferation measures? That’s an open question at the 
moment. 
Reactions to Rublee’s paper focused on the issues of enrichment and reprocessing, and 
whether states should be pursuing UAE-style nuclear cooperation agreements. One participant 
stated “in talking about nonproliferation, we can’t put all the responsibility on Vietnamese-style 
agreements regarding enrichment and reprocessing rights. FMCT has been languishing for a long 
time. We can’t just say that states that have signed the NPT are not engaged in nuclear hedging. 
If there’s no interest in nuclear weapons, and especially in a state where no domestic uranium 
deposits, wouldn’t it make sense to just say we are not interested in enrichment and 
reprocessing?” But a participant from Southeast Asia responded that, “we can’t just talk about 
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nonproliferation and forget about disarmament...We shouldn’t overlook the other obligations – 
for example, negative security assurances, nuclear weapons free zones. Everyone has to abide by 
the promises that they have made.” 
However, as another participant pointed out, “the ‘123 agreement’ (Vietnam-U.S. nuclear 
cooperation agreement) has not yet been signed, it is still in negotiation. The draft has been 
completed, but only a few people have seen it. So how could foreign observers know what the 
text is about? Most of the text is standard, there are no kinds of loopholes or opportunities to do 
enrichment and reprocessing.”  
Session Three: Great Power Rivalry and Regional Security 
Dr. Michael Malley (Center for Contemporary Conflict, USA) chaired the third session, with 
presentations by Dr. Raja Mohan (The Indian Express, New Delhi), Dr. Noel Morada 
(University of Queensland, Australia), and Dr. Robert Ayson (Victoria University of Wellington, 
New Zealand). 
The context for the third session was the continued growth of great power rivalry in 
Southeast Asia. Panelists were asked to consider how this rivalry is shaping the security policies 
of states in the region and whether it affects their perceptions of nuclear dangers 
Raja Mohan began the third session by discussing the broader political context that 
shapes responses to nuclear issues within the region. In particular, he argued that the rise of 
China and the emergence of India are shifting the balance of power from West to East. This 
strategic shift affects all facets of the discussion in Asia about nuclear issues, including the role 
of extended deterrence; the debate on arms control and disarmament; the rise of Chinese sea-
based nuclear capabilities; and the potential for spoilers within ASEAN. 
With the second nuclear age centered on Asia, he asked, how will countries in Southeast 
Asia respond to this shift? Can Southeast Asia continue to isolate itself from great power rivalry? 
He suggested that there is a lack of awareness in Southeast Asia of the strategic implications of 
this power shift, and a rose-tinted view of the ability of regional institutions to mitigate 
proliferation pressures (especially pressures created by China’s military expansion and growing 
regional assertiveness). In his view, Southeast Asia is in for a rude awakening, unless the level of 
strategic awareness increases.  
Noel Morada, the second speaker, focused on multilateral approaches to security in 
Southeast Asia. He outlined some of the tensions created by China’s growing assertiveness, 
including the spat between the United States and China over the South China Sea at the 
ADMM+ in Hanoi in October 2010. He wondered whether Clinton’s remarks had created 
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expectations among some Southeast Asia countries that the U.S. would come to their aid if China 
adopted a more aggressive policy. He raised questions over whether future U.S. administrations 
would remain as engaged in the region, and what the implication of a U.S. pull back would be 
for regional security dynamics.  
Morada also argued that the ARF might not be the appropriate forum to promote Asia-
Pacific security cooperation, because its membership is too large and its scope too broad. The 
East Asia summit may be “more efficient” due to its smaller membership, but he noted that U.S. 
involvement appears to be making China uncomfortable. In terms of nuclear threat perceptions, 
Morada argued that the most serious threat comes from the possibility of China and India’s 
nuclear rivalry being played out in the context of the South China Sea dispute.  
Robert Ayson examined several hypotheses about the impact of great power rivalry on 
the security of Southeast Asia. He contended that there is an intrinsic connection between great 
powers and nuclear proliferation. In the nuclear era, he said, great powers rely on themselves for 
their own security, and nuclear deterrence plays a central role. 
Great power cooperation and competition are having an impact on the security landscape 
in Southeast Asia specifically and Asia more broadly. Unknowns such as the sustainability of the 
U.S. nuclear deterrence, the trajectory of India as a great power, and the potential for the exercise 
of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia all impact the security landscape. Finally, both foreign 
and security policy in states in Southeast Asia are likely to focus more intensely on the great 
power race, namely the U.S. and China. Mr. Ayson posited that Southeast Asia was engaged in 
the pursuit of “self-help,” through conventional hedging and the use of regional organizations, 
and questioned whether nuclear energy development a part of this strategy. 
Discussion 
The first comment of the discussion concerned the degree to which great powers 
influence the international system, and the extent to which norms, treaties and international 
organizations govern relations. One participant, who took exception to the uncompromising and 
narrow realpolitik of Mohan’s paper in particular, declared that: “The NPT is not just great 
powers dictating the way that they want things to be; it was a product of substantial negotiations. 
International institutions and norms take on a life of their own—agents create the structure, but 
then the structure begins to shape the agents and their actions. As such, the NPT takes on a life of 
its own, and a meaning of its own. It can’t simply be changed on the whim of the great powers.” 
Another participant remarked that treaties often do reflect the interests of the great 
powers. Even though the smaller states were involved in NPT negotiations, they only achieved 
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minor victories. Article IV was “a crumb.” He noted that the NPT is not the same as it was in 
1970. “It has responded to changes and has evolved. There are loopholes, and these need to be 
dealt with practically – through initiatives like the PSI.”  
It was also noted that the original premise of the NPT has become more difficult to 
enforce as nuclear technology has spread. “We need to devise a more practical system, instead of 
just sticking to the original treaty.” 
In response, it was argued that the Iranian case is not problematic just because there are 
loopholes in the NPT – there are a whole host of reasons the Iranian nuclear issue has become so 
intractable. The same participant argued that every article of the NPT is very important and the 
Treaty as a whole should be seen as an evolving, regime-building process. There is a Review 
Conference every five years where members are supposed to review the NPT. This mechanism is 
very important because it provides a forum where members can bring issues for discussion and 
strengthen the Treaty.  
In light of this, another participant suggested that states in Southeast Asia should sit down 
and talk about what they are going to do about reprocessing and enrichment, for example, “rather 
sit and wait for the answer to come from above.”  
On the idea that Japan might end its threshold status and develop nuclear weapons, one 
participant argued strongly that this has been written about extensively, and the conclusion in the 
literature is that Japan is not going to go nuclear anytime soon because of a number of factors, 
including that it has a parliamentary system rather than a presidency, and that the nuclear 
industry is largely private.  
The participant who suggested that Japan might take the nuclear option responded: “We 
should always be open to the black swan emerging. There has been a generational change in 
Japan, and the new generation does not have the experience of WWII. Right wing parties may 
exploit threats, traditional nationalism and the rivalry between Japan and China. The possibility 
of Japan taking the nuclear weapons option might be a remote one, but we should not rule it out 
completely.” 
The definition of a “great power” sparked further debate. One participant noted that if the 
term is defined as a state that has the ability to defend itself, there might not be any at all. A 
panel member replied that he was aware of the limitations of great power theories, and they just 
naturally appealed to him. He stated that great concerns over power dynamics are now evident in 
Southeast Asia, and “if it matters to them, it matters.” 
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Another participant asserted that ASEAN has tried to protect itself from great power 
rivalry. “We want the great powers to work with us. China has accepted SEANWFZ and free 
trade agreements; it has the home advantage. This doesn’t mean that we want China to dominate 
the region, which is why we welcome some U.S. regional involvement. We still want Japan to be 
more active; it is our biggest financial backer. But the problem is that the Japanese prime 
minister and foreign minister changes every few years, so there is a lack of consistency.” 
One participant from the region mused that while ASEAN is in the driver’s seat in 
Southeast Asia, it may not have a current driver’s license. Southeast Asian states can easily 
bypass ASEAN when it comes to protecting self-interest. China would not give in to ASEAN on 
this point, he said. Several participants emphasized the importance of non-nuclear trends, and the 
positive effects that can be seen in this respect.  
One participant opposed the assertion that moves towards the elimination of nuclear 
weapons, including New START, may have a dangerous, destabilizing effect; that this may lead 
to others taking up the nuclear option (a reference to the debate on whether Japan will go nuclear 
as the U.S. nuclear arsenal diminishes). “A number of states have sought to take the ‘nuclear’ out 
of ‘deterrence,’ and may accept a conventional umbrella as opposed to a nuclear umbrella. 
Moving towards zero doesn’t necessarily have to have a negative security impact.”  
Others asserted that nuclear weapons-free zones have an important normative effect as 
symbolic statements that put pressure on nuclear weapons states. A participant from outside the 
region expressed the view that ASEAN is in a healthy state regarding the non-nuclear norm; it is 
striking, she said, that despite the great power pressures, the norm has survived. 
As the discussion moved towards the issue of deterrence, participants wondered how 
central nuclear weapons are to the concept, and whether it would be possible to achieve effective 
deterrence without the nuclear dimension. Can we leave the nuclear out of deterrence?  “The rise 
of China raises questions about this. U.S. power is perceived to be declining, and everyone will 
make their own calculations about what this means for them. The question is one of the relative 
power balance between the U.S. and China: not the question of extended deterrence. 
Session Four: Dealing with WMD Challenges 
Dr. Robert Ayson (Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand) chaired the fourth panel, 
which included presentations by Dr. Marianne Hanson (University of Queensland, Australia), 
Dr. Carolina Hernandez (University of the Philippines), Dr. Tan See Seng (Rajaratnam School 
of International Studies, Singapore), Ms. Angela Woodward (Verification Research, Training 
and Information Centre, VERTIC), and Mr. Ward Wilson (Center for Nonproliferation Studies).  
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The theme of session four was the expansion of the nonproliferation regime through 
numerous multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral initiatives. Panelists were asked to consider 
which of these initiatives are most effective and why, and to discuss how the evolving 
nonproliferation regime is perceived in Southeast Asia. 
Marianne Hanson began this session by discussing the impact of global initiatives on 
developments in Southeast Asia. Throughout 2010, she observed, international nuclear security 
cooperation appeared to make significant gains. The Nuclear Security Summit process garnered 
strong Southeast Asian participation, she noted. In addition, regional resistance to participation 
in PSI appears to be softening, in ways that parallel Southeast Asian views of their 1540 
obligations. It may also signal a growing willingness to consider participation in other ad hoc, 
plurilateral initiatives like PSI.  Finally, she noted that negotiations over the SEANWFZ protocol 
appear to be proceeding in a way that will lead the United States and other nuclear weapons 
states to become signatories.  
However, she also identified areas in which there is a need for further efforts to close 
loopholes in the NPT. In particular, she argued that it was crucial for Southeast Asian countries 
to adopt UAE-style limits on nuclear enrichment and reprocessing. The U.S.-India nuclear deal 
set a poor precedent in this regard. In addition, she observed that even though the issue of 
nuclear security is gaining traction, much more needs to be done.  
Carolina Hernandez reviewed ASEAN’s experience with nuclear nonproliferation 
initiatives in the past. For most of the time since the group was formed in the late 1960s, she said 
that nonproliferation has not occupied as high a priority in the security agenda of most Southeast 
Asian states or even in the security agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as domestic threats and non-conventional security challenges. However, the region 
was concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, and sought to address them mainly by 
isolating the region from great power rivalry. This was evident in its declaration of the region as 
a “zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality” in the early 1970s, and its adoption of the Bangkok 
Treaty in the late 1990s to make the region a nuclear weapons-free zone.   
She argued that the test of whether SEANWFZ can be further developed and 
strengthened lies in its implementation under the ASEAN Charter and the blueprint for the 
ASEAN political-security community. She acknowledged that ASEAN’s track record in security 
cooperation reflects an emphasis on voluntary cooperation without sanctions for non-
compliance. However, she also noted that efforts to develop SEANWFZ are “not entirely in the 
hands of ASEAN member states.” They require the active support of the nuclear weapons states, 
beginning with their accession to the Bangkok Treaty protocol. 
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Tan See Seng followed with a discussion of how Southeast Asian states are responding to 
WMD concerns, and whether multilateral and plurilateral initiatives can help to address WMD 
challenges in a cohesive manner. He identified three main approaches that Southeast Asian 
governments have taken. One is declaratory, and manifest principally in their adherence to 
SEANWFZ and the NPT, which he noted are “are important, but clearly limited by design.”  
The second is functional, and in this category he placed PSI, the Asian Senior-Level 
Talks on Nonproliferation (A-STOP), and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). These are 
more useful for practical purposes, but U.S. dominance of CSI and PSI has led to a cool response 
from countries in the region. Finally, there are overarching regional institutions, such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit. However, these institutions are broad in 
scope and are vulnerable to ideological and political clashes that hamper progress on narrow 
issues such as proliferation. 
The combination of these approaches is a “messy, inchoate mix,” and unlikely to change. 
It is also one on which few Southeast Asians “are prepared to count on their own regional 
institutions as providers much less guarantors of regional security.”  
The session’s final presentation broadened the discussion of WMD to include chemical 
and biological weapons (CBW) challenges. Angela Woodward described the range of challenges 
to include threats from dual-use materials, equipment, and delivery systems; the comparative 
ease of development and acquisition of CBW when compared to nuclear weapons; a rapidly 
evolving biological and chemical weapons convention; and a relatively small epistemic 
community when compared to the radiological and nuclear weapons field. In Southeast Asia the 
community of experts is even smaller. Another challenge is that many of the states that do not 
participate in CBW treaties do not participate in the discourse either. 
While the region still needs to overcome significant challenges on the CBW front, there 
have been some successes. For instance, individualizing state needs through in-country activities, 
involving regional partners and relevant NGOs in the discussion, demonstrating respect for 
uniquely national approaches, and effectively communicating have helped ASEAN countries 
deal with CBW problems. She acknowledged that fewer resources are available to deal with 
CBW threats compared to nuclear ones, but argued that biological and chemical initiatives in 
Southeast Asia need to be implemented on regional, sub-regional and national levels in order to 
be effective.  
To address Southeast Asian concerns about the lack of progress on disarmament by 
nuclear weapons states, Ward Wilson was invited to examine recent developments in U.S. 
policy. He stated that despite the priority placed on this issue by the Obama administration, and 
23 
re-invigorated debate from think tanks and experts, there has been no groundswell of domestic 
public support for disarmament in the U.S. Because of this, there is little political value in being 
in favor of disarmament, which limits governmental action on this issue. These domestic 
constraints help explain why despite the genuine commitment of the Obama administration to its 
disarmament agenda, progress is slow and hampered by legislative opposition. 
Discussion 
The discussion opened with support for the assertion that it is very difficult to harmonize 
security cooperation in Southeast Asia. Although there may be general agreement that a security 
issue presents a shared challenge, changing the terms of reference within ASEAN is not easy. 
ASEAN has not yet grasped the importance of thinking through solutions to long-term problems. 
For example, dealing with spent fuel is seen by some as an issue that will need to be dealt with in 
the future rather than at present because states are only in the early stages of nuclear 
development. Of more concern are the immediate issues, such as the economy.  
One participant from the region commented that WMD is a relatively new issue for 
ASEAN. The impetus for discussing this issue never comes from foreign ministries in the region, 
he said, but from the United States and European Union. Countries from outside the region have 
even proposed setting up a center of excellence to on export controls, but countries in the region 
are reluctant to accept the offer because of the costs involved. In general, the Southeast Asian 
view is that WMD should be handled by the United Nations, not ASEAN.  
A participant from outside the region observed that in Southeast Asia there are a lot of 
layers of activity aimed at promoting regional security cooperation, but it is not clear how much 
they actually add: “a lot of effort goes in, not much comes out.”  
He suggested that ASEAN members should focus on what can actually be achieved in 
concrete terms. One of the greatest regional weaknesses, he said, has been the lack of 
enforcement on the control of nuclear materials. This may create an opportunity for states in the 
region to change the way they cooperate, but only if they recognize it as a shared threat that 
requires a coordinated response.  
When the Khan network was uncovered, he noted, it was found that a key component 
was made in Malaysia. “If we’re serious about addressing WMD challenges, we should be doing 
more things that can actually contribute to WMD security rather than creating more big 
structures.” (This was a reference to the need for more functional, agency-level practical 
cooperation as opposed to the empty political rhetoric that often dominates elite level discussions 
in ASEAN). 
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This comment was followed by the observation that despite the vast contrast between the 
overarching institutions, and the differing interests of Southeast Asian states, cooperation is still 
possible. It may even be more effective to have cooperation between a smaller number of states 
rather than the whole region or all of ARF. If smaller projects may suit regional needs better, are 
these broader, overarching agreements really necessary? 
Another Southeast Asian participant agreed with Dr. Tan’s view that the regional 
preference has been for ad hoc regionalism, and that the result of this preference has been that 
“we are left with a slew of arrangements that don’t cohere together easily.” The participant also 
agreed that in terms of the specific nuclear security challenge, there is growing cooperation at the 
functional level. But she argued that overarching political frameworks remain important, because 
they set the stage for effective functional cooperation: political frameworks provide historical 
context and legitimize practical actions that follow. Each level works together; it’s not a question 
of one or the other. 
The point was made that ASEAN will naturally become more proactive on 
nonproliferation as nuclear energy expands into the region; it will become a priority at a time, 
and in a way that ASEAN sees fit. The same participant added: “don’t sort our problems out for 
us. ASEAN does not want to be dominated.”  
Session Five: Prospects for Cooperation – International Initiatives 
Tanya Ogilvie-White (University of Canterbury, New Zealand) chaired the fifth panel, with 
presentations by Johan Saravanamuttu (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), Ta 
Minh Tuan (Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam), and Febrian Ruddyard (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Indonesia). 
Session five examined Southeast Asian views of international approaches to nuclear 
nonproliferation and security. Participants were asked to look ahead to the 2012 Nuclear Security 
Summit and 2015 NPT Review Conference as key events on the international nuclear calendar.  
The session began with an examination of Malaysia’s evolving approach to 
nonproliferation. The first panelist, Johan Saravanmuttu, noted that Malaysia has played a key 
role in shaping ASEAN policy on this issue. In general, he said Malaysian policy on nuclear 
nonproliferation could be divided into two eras. The first ran from the early 1970s until the late 
1990s, and was marked by a concerted effort to promote the creation of a “zone of peace, 
freedom, and neutrality” (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia.  
Malaysia initiated this proposal, and hosted the meeting in 1971 during which ASEAN 
adopted it. ZOPFAN only implicitly rejected the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region, 
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so in the 1980s Malaysia supported an Indonesian initiative to draft a treaty that would establish 
a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region. Malaysia was among the first to sign the treaty in 
1995. Over the next decade, Malaysia and ASEAN continued to oppose nuclear proliferation, but 
neither made significant efforts to implement SEANWFZ. 
A second era, according to Saravanamuttu, appears to have begun recently. Following the 
SCOMI/SCOPE incident in 2004, in which a Malaysian firm was revealed to be connected to the 
A.Q. Khan network, Malaysia has slowly moved to embrace international nonproliferation norms 
and protocols in a concrete way. It remains wary of some international initiatives such as PSI, 
and maintains the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) position that there is no need to participate in 
PSI. However, in the past year Malaysia has participated in the Nuclear Security Summit, and 
passed a Strategic Trade Act designed to prevent illicit proliferation networks from exploiting 
Malaysia. 
Febrian Ruddyard followed with a discussion on the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in 
which he participated. Indonesia’s role in the conference was especially important, since it 
coordinated the NAM position. The conference, he said, has rightly been hailed as “momentous.” 
In contrast to the 2005 review conference, this one took place in a more “positive international 
environment,” that was made possible by the nuclear weapons states’ renewed commitment to 
nuclear disarmament. The conference itself was marked by an “open, all-inclusive and 
transparent process of negotiations and consultations,” which covered a wide range of issues and 
led to a consensus final document. 
The conference produced several developments that he considered especially important. 
The first is the commitment of NWS to accelerate concrete steps toward disarmament, and the 
request that they report back to the Preparatory Committee meeting in 2014. On nonproliferation, 
he noted that the review conference “underscored the importance of resolving all cases of non-
compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and member 
states’ respective legal obligation,” and encouraged all states parties to the NPT to conclude and 
bring into force the Additional Protocol as soon as possible. [Though he did not mention it, this 
is especially relevant in Southeast Asia, where only Indonesia and Singapore have ratified and 
implemented it.] In addition, the conference endorsed the establishment of a nuclear weapons-
free zone in the Middle East. 
Looking forward to the 2015 review conference, he noted that the NAM countries intend 
to “vigorously build on” the 2010 conference’s outcome document. He said NAM’s top priorities 
include the total elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025; universality of the NPT as soon as 
possible; commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention; and commencement 
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of negotiation “on a legally binding instrument to provide non-nuclear-weapons states with 
global, unconditional security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”  
The last panelist, Ta Minh Tuan, discussed ASEAN’s role in promoting cooperation in 
the region on all aspects of nuclear energy, safety, security, and nonproliferation. In particular, 
he argued that SEANWFZ must be updated to ensure that it does not become obsolete. The 
international agenda has moved beyond the cold war concerns that motivated ASEAN to 
establish SEANWFZ, but so far ASEAN has not taken steps to update the terms of the treaty to 
deal with contemporary proliferation challenges. 
He also stressed the importance of supporting new forums and arrangements, such as the 
working group on high-level waste management, which is convening in Vienna this year (and 
which Noramly Bin Muslim is chairing). He suggested that by promoting other mechanisms—
such as the ASEAN+3 nuclear forums, APEC civil nuclear energy forums, and ARF—ASEAN 
could build on the modest success of SEANWFZ. But he acknowledged that without great power 
commitments, it is unlikely that SEANWFZ will be able to reach its full potential. Lastly, he 
argued that ASEAN must develop a specific action plan based on the NPT Review Conference 
action plan. 
Discussion 
The first question from participants concerned the nuclear fuel cycle. Was there any sense 
at the Review Conference that states considering nuclear energy programs are insistent on their 
right to full indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities? Was there any sense that they 
could be willing to support multilateral fuel cycle arrangements? One of the panelists responded 
that attitudes to multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approaches are complicated, even within NAM. 
Currently, there is no collective NAM position to submit to Vienna for discussion. There is a 
current IAEA study on this but NAM has not come to a common position; it is buying time to 
allow national studies first. There is certainly no “ASEAN position” either, the speaker added, 
since Southeast Asian governments regard debate over the issue as premature.  
One participant asked whether Mohammed ElBaradei’s proposal to remove the option for 
withdrawal from the NPT makes sense to ASEAN?  One of the panelists responded that Article 
X withdrawal proposals were indeed a sticking point at the 2010 Review Conference. From the 
perspective of Southeast Asia, the region needs to address the issue of how it would deal with a 
case of withdrawal from the NPT, as there are currently no provisions for calling an emergency 
meeting if this were to occur within the region. However, some states in the region do feel that 
the option for withdrawal from the NPT is not appropriate so there could be some movement on 
this in future. 
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There was a series of questions about what steps ASEAN could have taken prior to the 
Review Conference. “Was there a coherent ASEAN position, even if it was only to support the 
NAM position? Should there be a role for ASEAN with respect to the action plan?” 
In reply, a participant said that a statement from the chair of the SEANWFZ commission 
had been drafted, as a way of publicizing SEANWFZ to the international community. He was 
unsure what could be done at the ASEAN level besides trying to convince the nuclear weapons 
states to sign the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty, but mentioned the upcoming 3rd ARF Inter-
Sessional Meeting (ARF-ISM) on nonproliferation. This meeting, he said, would finalize a work 
plan, which includes items on counter-terrorism, WMD, UNSCR 1540, and preventing a 
destabilizing arms race in the ASEAN region.  
The next comments related to the disarmament side of the Review Conference, and how 
that relates to other instruments. “If you’re going to be serious about disarmament, it’s going to 
have to be multilateral rather than bilateral. But getting China to buy in will be a major 
challenge.” 
On the issue of great power involvement, participant from outside Southeast Asia 
suggested that China has presented itself as the “best” nuclear weapons state, in terms of its 
statements on disarmament. At the 2010 Review Conference, she noted, China’s statements gave 
it “a glowing reputation” among NAM members, while the other nuclear weapons states bore the 
brunt of criticism for their lack of progress on disarmament. Another participant commented that 
this was a case of clever diplomacy on China’s part, but added that this does not detract from the 
fact that China is the only one of the five nuclear weapons states that is currently expanding its 
nuclear capabilities. 
Another panel member asserted the need to get nuclear energy and nuclear security-
building on the agenda within ASEAN; otherwise, he said, these issues will not receive enough 
attention. However, the implementation of the 64 action points of the 2010 Review Conference 
largely depends on national efforts. China announced that it is willing to accept SEANWFZ and 
sign the protocol, but no action has been taken towards this. In its position papers, it sounds as 
though it is ready, but it will likely be the last of the NWS to sign. 
The panel was asked what they thought about the recent reports in the media that 
question China’s commitment to its no-first use policy, as it was a topic of interest in the West. 
They responded that in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia there had not been much debate or 
discussion at all. For Vietnam and Malaysia, there are more important foreign policy concerns.  
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This disjuncture between Western and Southeast Asian attention to China’s nuclear 
weapons policy led to a discussion about the priority of domestic concerns in most Southeast 
Asian countries, and the limitations these place on foreign policy actions and resources. A 
participant from the region asked, where do the resources come from for regional or international 
initiatives when your domestic constituents have more pressing concerns about economic 
development? 
A speaker from outside the region pointed out that some ASEAN states have received 
external assistance to address security issues that are not necessarily high domestic priorities, 
e.g., in small arms and light weapons trafficking. There are parallels, the speaker suggested, with 
the field of WMD, in which external assistance can promote security and development, thereby 
reducing the apparent tension between the two. 
Session Six: Prospects for Cooperation: Regional Initiatives 
Professor Marianne Hanson (University of Queensland, Australia) chaired the final panel, with 
presentations by Ferhat Aziz (National Nuclear Energy Agency, Indonesia), Noramly Bin 
Muslim (Atomic Energy Licensing Board, Malaysia), David Capie (Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand), Pavin Chachavalpongpun (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore), and Termsak Chalermpalanupap (ASEAN Secretariat).  
The final session explored the numerous regional initiatives that are underway to tackle 
nuclear security and safety challenges in Southeast Asia. Panelists were asked to consider how 
these initiatives are progressing, how the 2012 review of SEANWFZ Plan of Action is likely to 
shape up, and how regional nonproliferation initiatives can complement international ones.  
Ferhat Aziz began the final session with a presentation on Indonesia’s nuclear energy 
plans, and the role that regional cooperation could play. Indonesia has worked with the IAEA on 
improving the safety and security of its nuclear facilities, and has built up a nuclear science base 
through BATAN. Multilateral cooperation on nuclear energy, including waste management and 
fuel supply, could have strong regional benefits. Opening the channels of communication, 
increased transparency and building mutual cooperation could be a stepping-stone for Southeast 
Asian regional integration. By working together on nuclear energy issues – safety, security and 
nonproliferation – could also be a step towards meeting ASEAN commitments to establish a 
security community by 2015, he concluded. 
Noramly Bin Muslim spoke about the increasing concern regarding spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management in the region. He argued that ASEAN states may not have the 
capability to manage the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle within their borders, and lack the 
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economic or technological capabilities to support these activities. He suggested that although 
many states in Southeast Asia are anxious to get nuclear energy programs up and running, a 
number of specific issues need to be addressed first. These include increasing the development of 
information and knowledge management networks, adherence to international treaties and 
conventions, development of human resources, fuel supply arrangements, consultation on 
location of sites, the future decommissioning of nuclear facilities and spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management.  
David Capie addressed the issue of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia more broadly. 
He raised the point that there are a huge number of agreements and commitments in the region 
that suffer from compliance and implementation problems; this is not exclusive to those related 
to nuclear issues, and is often the result of a lack of national capacity. He also pointed out that 
ASEAN is not synonymous with “Southeast Asia”: cooperation does not necessarily have to go 
through ASEAN. Similarly, Track II dialogue can play an important role in stimulating 
discussion, and creating opportunities for the development of nuclear security and safety 
frameworks. 
Pavin Chachavalpongpun followed with a discussion of SEANWFZ. What has the plan 
of action achieved so far? Could SEANWFZ be more vital in a nuclear energy age, and what 
future role could it play? Are there any alternatives? Pavin suggested that thus far, SEANWFZ 
has been more symbolic than substantial. However, it has the potential to act as a coordination 
mechanism on nuclear security and safety issues within the region for science, health and 
technology agencies. In particular, SEANWFZ could be a starting point for ASEAN dialogue on 
nuclear issues, including disarmament, global initiatives such as PSI, enrichment and 
reprocessing, and compliance.  
The final presentation was delivered by Termsak Chalermpalanupap, who described 
recent changes in ASEAN’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation. In particular, he focused on 
fresh efforts reconcile a tension between conflicting articles in the Bangkok Treaty, other efforts 
to persuade the five permanent members of the U.S. Security Council (P-5) to sign the protocol 
to the Bangkok Treaty, and the broadening of ASEAN’s nonproliferation commitment to include 
all types of WMD. 
He noted that the Bangkok Treaty, which established the SEANWFZ, has suffered from 
tension between two provisions. Article 3 requires that each state not permit nuclear weapons 
within their territory, while Article 7 allows each state to determine on its own whether to permit 
foreign ships and aircraft—which may be carrying nuclear weapons—to enter its territory. The 
challenge of reconciling these provisions is greatest for U.S. security partners in the region, 
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namely the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Recent discussions indicate that progress may 
be made on this issue during Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN. 
Accession of the five NPT-recognized NWS to the Bangkok Treaty protocol is a 
longstanding ASEAN goal. China and ASEAN issued a joint statement in 2004 that confirmed 
China’s willingness to sign the protocol, but the SEANWFZ Commission decided not to invite 
China to sign, he said, “for doing so would alienate the other four NWS,” which continue to 
object to part of the treaty and the protocol. 
He listed three sets of issues that need to be resolved in order to win support from the 
other four NWS (P-4). One concerns transit rights and port/airfield visits by foreign military 
vessels and aircraft; this requires reconciling the tensions between Articles 3 and 7. Another and 
“more difficult issues” is the zone of application. The P-4 object to the inclusion of exclusive 
economic zones and continental shelves in the territory covered by SEANWFZ. He noted that 
ASEAN members are “very unlikely [to] curtail the zone application of SEANWFZ, chiefly 
because they need maximum protection against dumping of radioactive material or other 
dangerous wastes.” 
Two other sets of issues that need to be resolved, Termsak said. One is the P-4 objection 
to text in the treaty protocol that demands the NWS provide a “blanket negative security 
assurance” against the use of nuclear weapons against third parties in the territory covered by 
SEANWFZ. The other is P-4 concern that SEANWFZ amounts to an “unlawful exercise of 
sovereignty” over the high seas. 
There are reasons to believe progress on these issues is likely to occur in the near future, 
he said. One reason is that the P-4 seems to have softened their objections to nuclear weapons-
free zones. In this regard, he said ASEAN had taken note of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 
statement during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In addition, ASEAN has taken steps to 
speed the process. In 2011, ASEAN foreign ministers “welcomed the U.S. interest to move 
forward on SEANWFZ and requested Indonesia, as the ASEAN Chair, to work towards 
resuming direct consultations with the five NWS this year.” 
Outside of discussions about SEANWFZ, he acknowledged that “WMD has seldom been 
discussed directly in any ASEAN meeting.” Neither the foreign ministers nor defense ministers 
have sought to address this subject. This led him to conclude that “WMD is still a relatively new 




The discussion began with a question about reconciling Article 3 (under which states 
agree not to permit the stationing or transport of nuclear weapons) and Article 7 (under which 
they are permitted to decide for themselves whether to allow foreign ships and aircraft to visit or 
pass through their territory) in SEANWFZ. Attendees posed several questions, including how 
will this actually be resolved? Is it possible to consider that the Chinese would be willing to live 
with SEANWFZ, while it might affect the U.S. more significantly? A panelist speculated that in 
the conflict between Article 3 and Article 7, sovereignty would prevail.  
A participant remarked on the need to be realistic about what SEANWFZ can aspire to 
be, noting that it is part of the mechanism for disarmament, rather than a disarmament instrument 
itself. In addition, one needs to be realistic about ASEAN’s limits: when it comes to WMD 
issues, ASEAN members look to the Western members of ARF to deal with them because the 
former have neither the capacity or the interest to take concrete action, whereas the latter have 
both.  
Another participant stated that a lot of work was done within CSCAP on the Bangkok 
Treaty, to identify its weaknesses, whether it needed to be revised, and the potential for 
cooperation between nuclear weapons free zones globally. However, in trying to find out from 
foreign ministries how the treaty of Rarotonga is implemented and if there is a lot of cooperation, 
it was found that the treaty was more symbolic than practical, which perhaps sheds an interesting 
light on nuclear weapons free zone more generally. The origins of treaties can reflect priorities at 
the time of creation, but this does not necessarily reflect current realities.  
The point was made that it is ironic that China has agreed to sign the SEANWFZ 
protocol, because it knows that unless the other four nuclear weapons states sign, there will be 
nothing for China to sign at all. A participant from Southeast Asia stated that it is not realistic to 
expect the nuclear weapons states to sign the protocol in the next few years. He described 
SEANWFZ as a “political commitment” by ASEAN, and the lack of progress toward 
implementation affects the Association’s credibility. Therefore, he argued, ASEAN cannot wait 
to take steps toward implementation. 
One panelist sought clarification on the process by which the nuclear weapons states 
would sign the protocol, and whether China’s offer to sign had been formally rejected by 
ASEAN. A Southeast Asian participant replied that ASEAN needs to wait for the other nuclear 
weapons states to be ready to sign, because ASEAN understands that the protocol must be 
revised before being signed and wants all NWS to sign an identical protocol. ASEAN informed 
China of its decision to reject its offer to sign via a joint communiqué in 2004. 
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It was commented that there seemed to be a greater impetus for functional and technical 
cooperation and informal Track II dialogue in Southeast Asia rather than more formal elite level 
political cooperation. One of the panelists agreed. He added that there had been a CSCAP 
proposal to formally set up a study group on nuclear energy, which would be a sub group of the 
WMD Study Group (like the Export Controls Experts Group).  
In response to criticism from a participant regarding the lack of implementation of the 
Bangkok Treaty and its 2007 “Plan of Action” within ASEAN, one of a panelist responded that: 
“we don’t do what we’ve said we won’t do” (i.e. implementation is tied to NWS signing the 
Protocol, which they have not yet done). However, verification is difficult, because states in the 
region do not have the tools and capabilities to, for example, verify and monitor whether Chinese 
or U.S. submarines are passing through their waters.  
The discussion concluded with some final remarks from the panel. Noramly remarked 
that ASEAN is basically an economic forum. In order to improve the quality of life, you must 
have industry. We started off with conventional energy, he said, and this led to discussions about 
sharing power through an ASEAN power grid. A lot of things have been done on renewable 
energy too. More recently, nuclear energy has had increased interest in the power grid. 
Termsak highlighted the achievements of SEANWFZ within the region: no nuclear 
weapons, no nuclear attacks, no dumping of radioactive waste, cooperation with the IAEA, and 
increased signing of international nuclear agreements. “It is important that as a group, Southeast 
Asia takes a stand—that we want our region to be free of nuclear weapons and WMD, and that 
we want support from the world for this.” 
Concluding Session: Key Findings and Questions for the Future 
In the concluding session, Michael Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White summarized the views that 
participants had expressed on three main issues, and identified questions that merit discussion in 
future workshops.  
Emerging Nuclear Challenges 
One of the key questions discussed during the workshop was, What kind of challenges 
are likely to arise as the use of nuclear power becomes more widespread, and as strategic 
uncertainty increases?  
Nuclear safety was the most widely and readily acknowledged challenge, and participants 
agreed that within official circles in Southeast Asia this challenge is the most widely recognized 
and accepted one. For the most part, countries prefer to deal with nuclear safety on a national 
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basis, but in close cooperation with the IAEA. However, a regional approach is emerging within 
ASEAN under the auspices of the energy ministers. 
Nuclear security is considered a relatively new and unfamiliar subject in Southeast Asia, 
since it falls outside the three pillars of the NPT. As a result, there is little consensus yet among 
Southeast Asians, whether in this workshop or more generally, about the nature of this challenge 
or how it should be addressed.  There is great uncertainty over how governments should 
prioritize security threats. However, awareness of these threats is rising, and governments have 
begun to embrace international initiatives to tackle them, including support for the 1540 
committee’s work and the Nuclear Security Summit process. 
Nuclear proliferation, in the eyes of most Southeast Asians, is not likely to be a major 
challenge in their region. In particular, none of the participants from Southeast Asia believe that 
the establishment of civilian nuclear energy programs will increase the chance that governments 
in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Likewise, none thought that changes in the 
regional balance of power would lead governments to seek nuclear weapons. Overwhelmingly, 
they believed that Southeast Asian governments’ commitment to the NPT and SEANWFZ were 
solid and likely to endure in spite of changes in domestic capabilities or international rivalries. 
On this point, participants from outside the region were less sanguine. 
Cooperation to Meet New Challenges 
The second major question addressed during the workshop was, what kinds of 
cooperation will be needed to meet these challenges? Since individual governments acting alone 
can meet none of the dangers identified above, cooperation of some sort is necessary.  
The protracted discussions about ASEAN that took place throughout the workshop 
revealed two clear patterns. In the realms of nuclear safety and security, governments prefer to 
address challenges through national implementation and enforcement of internationally agreed 
standards. However, they recognize that their own national capacities are limited, and they are 
prepared to accept aid that is offered to them by international organizations and by developed 
countries.  
Despite recent efforts to enhance cooperation on nuclear energy within ASEAN, the 
Association’s role in these areas is limited. It simply does not have the capacity to assist 
countries in meeting international standards, let alone set regional ones. But this should not lead 
outside observers to conclude that ASEAN members (in contrast to ASEAN as an organization) 
are reluctant to cooperation. In fact, nearly all ASEAN members (with the notable exception of 
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Burma) are strongly inclined to cooperate individually with international organizations and 
countries able to offer assistance directly.  
In the area of nuclear proliferation, Southeast Asian governments also recognize the need 
for cooperation, but prefer a different mode of cooperation. At the global level, they tend to rely 
heavily on diplomatic endorsement of the nonproliferation regime, particularly its NPT core, and 
they resist mandatory commitments. Most countries in the region also resist plurilateral 
initiatives, like PSI, that are not established by international agreements. At the regional level, 
they approach nonproliferation through SEANWFZ. So far, they have not taken steps to go 
beyond SEANWFZ. Participants from the region readily acknowledged that the treaty that 
established the zone needs to be updated, but did not expect changes to occur soon. 
ASEAN’S Role 
Despite widespread skepticism of ASEAN’s ability to act decisively, the discussions 
during the workshop showed that ASEAN is able to play distinctly constructive roles in issues 
that concern the main nuclear challenges the region is likely to face. 
First, it can endorse international standards, agreements, and commitments, and thereby 
enhance their legitimacy among ASEAN members. In doing so, ASEAN makes it easier for 
individual members to take actions to enforce or comply with international agreements. 
Second, ASEAN may be able to coordinate regional implementation of international 
standards. Coordination is less costly than actual implementation and may be feasible and 
acceptable, especially in the area of nuclear safety.  
Third, the Association can pursue one of its traditional roles, confidence building, with 
respect to emerging nuclear challenges. In particular, it may wish to provide mutual reassurance 
of benign intent regarding the establishment of new nuclear capabilities.  
Finally, the Bangkok Treaty provides a legal basis for ASEAN to pursue roles that it has 
so far deferred. In particular, it could choose to develop the capacity for verification and 
monitoring of compliance with the treaty, which contains provisions not just on the well-known 
SEANWFZ but also on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Questions for the Future 
Several issues arose that clearly merit further consideration over the next several years. 
Perhaps the most important concerns the future of SEANWFZ. One question is whether the 
NWS and ASEAN can agree on changes to the treaty protocol that accommodate each party’s 
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concerns. Most participants felt that this would produce a significant change in the region’s 
security and strengthen the prospects for nonproliferation. 
Another question on this issue is whether ASEAN members themselves will seek to 
update the Bangkok Treaty, either through amendments (unlikely) or new interpretations or 
annexes (more likely). Participants from the region spoke forthrightly and frankly about the lack 
of fit between the treaty and contemporary nuclear and other WMD challenges. Will this 
awareness lead to actual changes? 
A second issue is the impact of great power rivalry on security dynamics in Southeast 
Asia, and especially on the durability of their commitment to nonproliferation. Participants from 
Southeast Asia overwhelmingly reject the possibility that their governments would soften let 
alone reverse their opposition to nuclear proliferation. But participants from outside the region, 
drawing on comparisons with other regions of the world, were not prepared to rule out such a 
fundamental change. Is such a change really unthinkable? What might strengthen or weaken 
ASEAN members’ stand against proliferation? 
Third, Southeast Asian speakers attributed a great deal of recent progress on the NPT and 
SEANWFZ to progress by the NWS on disarmament. But this raises two questions: If progress 
toward disarmament slows—and especially if some NWS enhance their nuclear arsenals—how 
will Southeast Asian commitments to nonproliferation be affected? More broadly, how would 
the region’s security dynamics change? 
Fourth, the need for limits on enrichment and reprocessing has been widely discussed 
internationally, but so far has received little attention in Southeast Asia. Indeed, participants from 
outside the region felt that it has not been taken seriously in the region. Why not? And what 
could cause views in the region to change? 
Finally, many Southeast Asian participants viewed international initiatives to address 
nuclear security and proliferation challenges in their region as “premature.” Implicit in this 
judgment is the possibility that such initiatives may become more relevant. What sort of changes 
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